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Highlights
• Ruling pro-European parties and long-established Communist Party lost significantly.
• Moldova’s Socialist Party were the biggest winner.
• The elections concern more than ethnic and geopolitical cleavages.
• Endemic corruption is harming established parties’ reputation and electability.
• Moldova’s elections demonstrate continued electoral and institutional volatility.
Please cite this article in press as: Brett, D., Knott, E., Moldova’s parliamentary elections of
November 2014, Electoral Studies (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2015.09.002.
1 Background
The parliamentary elections of December 2014 in the Republic of Moldova (hereafter Moldova) were
the eighth elections since independence from the USSR, held 20 years after the first competitive
parliamentary elections (1994) and conducted 5 years after the Twitter Revolution (2009) that
brought down Vladimir Voronin’s Communist (PCRM) government. Given Moldova’s ethnic mix,
its geographical location and complex history as well as the continuing frozen conflict in the de
facto state of Transnistria (where Moldovan elections are not conducted), the media have framed
Moldova’s elections through the prism of ethnic politics and as pivotal in indicating Moldova’s future
geopolitical orientation.
The 2014 elections were interesting for several reasons. Firstly, while the pro-European parties
(Liberal Democrats/PLDM, Democrats/PDM and Liberals/PL) managed to form a coalition after
2009, their 2014 vote share fell significantly (Table 1). PCRM also suﬀered significant losses, while
a new party, the Socialists (PSRM), gained from the structural weaknesses of both PCRM and the
pro-European parties. However, these results need to be analysed not through a simple division
between ethnic Russian speakers looking to Russia, and Moldovan/Romanian speakers looking to
the West and the EU (e.g. Herszenhorn, 2014). Rather, we must recognize that voters’ choices are
not driven only by ethnic politics, geopolitical or transitional attitudes but also by the incapacity
and unwillingness of Moldova’s political elite to reform political institutions and political culture.
Secondly, regional divides need to be contextualised within Moldova’s electoral system, where, as a
1
Brett & Knott Moldova’s Parliamentary Elections of November 2014
single constituency, it is the share of absolute votes (not regionally proportional votes) that need to
be analysed; any regional divides are outweighed by demographics.
Table1: Votes and Seats Won in 2010 and 2014
2010 2014
Party Votes % Seats Votes % Seats Change
Socialist Party of Moldova (PSRM) 327,910 20.51 25 25
Liberal-Democratic Party (PLDM) 506,253 29.42 32 322,188 20.18 23 -9
Communist Party of Moldova (PCRM) 677,069 39.34 42 279,372 17.48 21 -21
Democratic Party (PDM) 218,620 12.7 15 252,489 15.8 19 4
Liberal Party (PL) 171,336 9.96 12 154,507 9.67 13 1
Alliance "Our Moldova"(AMN) 35,289 2.05 0
Movement for European Action (MAE) 21,049 1.22 0
Humanist Party of Moldova (PUM) 15,494 0.9 0
National Liberal Party (PNL) 10,938 0.64 0 6,859 0.43 0 0
Christian-Democratic People’s Party
(PPCD)
9,083 0.53 0 11,782 0.74 0 0
United Moldova (PMUEM) 8,238 0.48 0
For Nation and Country (PpN?) 4,894 0.28 0 1,697 0.11 0 0
Social-Political Roma Movement of
Moldova (MRRM)
2,394 0.14 0
Conservative Party (PC) 2,089 0.12 0
Popular Republican Party (PPR) 1,997 0.12 0
"Ravnopravie" Movement (MR) 1,781 0.1 0
Republican Party of Moldova (PRM) 1,763 0.1 0
Moldovan Patriots (PPM) 1,580 0.09 0 1,498 0.09 0 0
Ecologist Green Party (PVE) 1,380 0.08 0 1,366 0.09 0 0
Labour Party (PM) 873 0.05 0
Communist Reform Party (PCR) 78,719 4.92 0
’Moldova’s Choice - Customs Union’ Elec-
toral Bloc (BeAMUV)
55,089 3.45 0
People’s Anti-Mafia Movement (MPA) 27,843 1.74 0
Liberal Reform Party (PLR) 24,956 1.56 0
People’s Party of Moldova (PPRM) 12.11 0.76 0
People’s Force Party (PFP) 11,672 0.73 0
Renaissance Party (PR) 4,158 0.26 0
Democratic Action (PAD) 2.564 0.16 0
"Democracy at Home" (PDA) 2.449 0.15 0
Centrist Union of Moldova (UCM) 633 0.04 0
Independents 19: 18,832 1.09 0 4: 18,651 1.17 0
Total of parties getting below 6% 91,452 5.31 0 183,357 11.12 0
Invalid 11,907 0.69 50,948 3.08
Total 1,720,993 101 1,649,508 101
(Turnout) 65% 56%
2 Rules
Moldova is a unicameral parliamentary republic consisting of 101 MPs. Elections use proportional
representation on closed lists in a single state-wide constituency every four years. Turnout must
reach one third of registered voters for a valid election.
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The electoral system should incentivise parties to work together, and it should work against
independents and smaller parties; however, this has not yet occurred. Rather, Moldova’s threshold
of 6% for parties is one of the highest in the world. While electoral thresholds were lowered during
20092010 (Cantir, 2011), since 2013, they have been raised back to 6% for parties, 9% for electoral
blocs of two parties and 11% for electoral blocs of three or more parties. These thresholds may have
been raised to prevent PSRM from entering parliament, but instead they kept out the Communist
Reform Party (PCR).
A second important element is the redistribution of seats. In 2010 (8.6% of votes cast, 147,715
votes) and in 2014 (a 16.4% of votes cast in 2014, 303,042 votes) a significant number of votes were
redistributed away from losing parties, i.e. those who fell below the electoral threshold, to winning
parties; more this number of redistributed votes doubled between 2010 and 2014. Until 2009,
Moldova used the D’Hondt system. They then switched to the equality or Robin Hood system
(Botan, 2010), where seats are distributed to each elected party sequentially (starting with the
largest first). The D’Hondt system was seen to favour larger parties like PCRM, and the equality
system to favour allocation to smaller parties (see also Cantir, 2011). Thus the system was changed
not to improve representation, but to weaken the power of the PCRM and to assist the opposition
parties, who because of their divisions scored lower individually but higher collectively.
The volatility of the electoral rules (e.g. the constant changing of electoral thresholds) indicates
the unwillingness of those in power to increase the competitiveness of Moldova’s political system,
whose high PR thresholds are lower only than Iran, Turkey and Russia (Council of Europe, 2003).
Moreover, it illustrates the willingness of pro-European parties to use the electoral system to con-
strain their opponents (PCRM 20092010, PSRM after 2014).
The 2014 elections were the first where Soviet-era passports were no longer accepted, rendering
21,729 people unable to vote (Promo-LEX, 2015). While this could be interpreted as a sign of
modernizing and de-Sovietizing Moldova, it can also be seen as an attempt to prevent those retain-
ing Soviet-era passports (e.g. the elderly) from voting. Such voters are seen as conservative and
thus likely to vote either for parties that appear more pro-Russian geopolitically or more statist
economically, or for those with authoritarian tendencies.
3 Substance
The attempt by PCRM to hold onto power in the April 2009 elections through fraudulent means
brought people onto the streets. The mass protests brought down the PCRM government, forc-
ing new elections. The so-called Twitter Revolution, chiefly led by Moldova’s young post-Soviet
generation (Knott, 2013), signified a watershed of hope, with the promise of European integration
and political reform oﬀered by the tripartite coalition that came to power. However, in 2013-14,
any remaining hope dissipated with the collapse of the coalition and government, which managed
to hold on until 2014 to avoid early elections. The pro-European coalition had lost its legitimacy,
due to its inability to improve on the issues of greatest concern: anti-corruption and socio-economic
reform. While Moldova’s media has improved since PCRM left oﬃce, becoming freer and fairer,
it remains subject to political interference, given the ownership of media by the political elite (in
particular PDM’s Plahotniuc, who owns four out of five national channels) and the biased stance
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of these outlets to the political interests of their owners (OSCE, 2014b).
The Ukraine crisis that began in November 2014, the on-going civil war in the east and Russia’s
annexation of Crimea casts a long shadow over Moldovan politics. For many observers outside and
inside Moldova, the frozen conflict in Transnistria, with an ethno-linguistically Russian population
and elites that overtly look to Moscow rather than Brussels, meant that Moldova was at risk of
potential instability vis-a-vis Russia. Thus the elections took place against a backdrop of regional
instability. According to unoﬃcial reports, propaganda in rural areas emphasized that a vote for
the EU was a vote for war; how widespread or eﬀective this was is unknown.
The party system is highly volatile and fragmented. Far from a single ethnic geopolitical cleavage
pitting a pro-Russian, ethnic Russian, socially and economically conservative left, (PCRM, PSRM,
PN), against a pro-European, ethnically Moldovan/Romanian, socially liberal, free market right
(PL, PDM, PLDM), the reality is more complex. Moldovans identify additional cleavages frac-
turing their society as well: generational, urban-rural, class, and between those connected to the
state/system and those outside of the state (Samuelson, 2013). Moreover, these categories overlap,
so identities can shift depending on the context, and this is reflected in voting behaviour. PCRM
voters are not necessarily elderly rural Russian-speaking peasants, fearful of the EU, nor are Ro-
manian speakers necessarily the core supporters of pro-European parties such as PLDM. However,
parties do instrumentalise symbolic and geopolitical debates in defining themselves vis-a-vis other
parties (Danero Iglesias, 2015).
Organizationally, parties are top down enterprises, based on patronage networks and charismatic
domination, which makes them prone to schism. The PCRM slogan of Doar comunitii, doar Voronin
(Only the Communists, Only Voronin), or the Ghimpu family’s role in the PL illustrates this
charismatic domination. The only way for new leaders to emerge from within is via a split. Both
PDM and PSRM were established by factions leaving PCRM to increase the power of their leaders
(PDM: Marian Lupu, PSRM: Igor Dodon). Thus the volatility of the party system stems less from
ideological and more from personal diﬀerences.
Issues such as corruption, poverty, economic issues and anger towards Chisinau led to the emer-
gence of two forms of outsiders entering the electoral processindependent candidates and a political
party led by a charismatic millionaire. The journalist and activist Oleg Brega, who stood as an
independent, garnered the most attention and votes. Brega, a long time critic of the political au-
thorities (Vdovii, 2014), was attacked and physically assaulted twice in two days during the summer,
in one incident by the driver of a former PCRM MP (ICJ, 2014). Despite having few funds, Brega
returned the strongest result by an independent candidate since 2001; however, it was not enough
to get him elected.
The second outsider was the Patria Party (PP), led by 36-year-old millionaire businessman Renato
Usatîi. Usatîi’s populist campaign was avowedly pro-Russian, but more substantively focused on
anti-corruption rhetoric and reversing privatisation (Champion, 2014). In the last days of the
electoral campaign, Patria, which had been polling at 710%, was deregistered (E-Democracy 2014).
Following allegations of foreign financing, Moldova’s Central Electoral Commission requested the
Court of Appeals dismiss PP, which the court did three days before the election. Moldova’s Supreme
Court upheld the decision the day before the elections. The OSCE (2014a) voiced concern about the
expedited process of this deregistration, given the timing. Moreover, the use of the courts which
4
Brett & Knott Moldova’s Parliamentary Elections of November 2014
comprise judges aligned with the pro-European parties to uphold this decision demonstrates the
politicisation of the dismissal. The situation was made more complex by allegations that Patria
was controlled by the FSB (Publika.MD 2014), as well as by a cache of guns police found during a
raid on a paramilitary movement linked to Patria. Following the banning of Patria, Usatîi fled to
Russia, fearing arrest, and did not return until May this year. He then ran for mayor in the city of
Bli and won convincingly in the first round.
The closing stages of the election were made more confusing by the presence of a number of
bogus parties (Seton-Watson, 1963). These parties appeared with similar names and iconography
to established parties, to confuse voters and to take votes from these parties. PCRM attempted to
prevent PCR from taking part in the elections; however, the courts rejected these attempts (OSCE,
2014b). PCR seems to have played a crucial role in taking votes away from PCRM and PSRM;
that they did not figure in opinion polls suggests voter confusion. The 4.92% of the vote that went
to PCR was crucial in denying PCRM and PSRM a majority. Similarly, the People’s Anti-Mafia
Movement (MPA), established by a former Voronin advisor, seems to have been intended as a spoiler
party to take votes away from other anti-corruption candidates. In combination with high electoral
thresholds, this made it diﬃcult for new parties to enter and for established parties to gain decisive
majorities.
4 Results
Compared to 2010 (65%), turnout shrank to 56% (Table 1). However, in historical perspective, the
number of ballots was still higher than 20012009, where the total number of votes cast was never
greater than 1,600,000 (20012009). The number of invalid ballots also increased, likely because of
the suspension of Patria Party shortly before the election.
Overall, the 2014 elections exhibited a number of interesting shifts. Firstly, PCRM, the largest
party since 2001, lost about half their vote (and seats). Secondly, PLDM, the second largest since
2009, lost almost half their votes, along with nine seats. By contrast, the other pro-European parties
gained voters and seats, even if overall the coalition’s total seats fell due to PLDM’s losses. Lastly,
and significantly, PSRM, who did not run in 2010, picked up the votes and seats lost by PCRM and
PLDM, to gain the largest vote share (21%) and number of seats (25/101).
With the surge in support for PSRM, the number of parliamentary parties increased from four
to five, while no independents crossed the necessary threshold. The percentage of votes for parties
who did not win seats jumped from 8% to 16%. Among these was PCR, who narrowly missed the
single-party threshold (6%) by receiving only 5%.
While Moldova is often depicted as a state divided ethnically, linguistically and geographically,
because it is a single constituency, in 2014 all parties derived their greatest support from Moldova’s
capital city, Chisinau. This eﬀect is most visible for the smallest of the pro-European parties (PL),
but it is also evident in terms of the two biggest parties (PLDM and PSRM), who stand on opposite
sides of the pro vs. anti-EU cleavage.
The results of Moldova’s 2014 elections were certainly a shock in terms of the increasing support
for PSRM and flagging support for PLDM and PCRM. PSRM was able to capitalise on declining
popular trust in PCRM and dissatisfaction with the pro-European parties following the 2013 scandal
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and breakdown of the government; the involvement of PLDM leader Vlad Filat at the heart of this
scandal hurt trust in PLDM and Filat himself substantially. Thus pro-European parties demon-
strated themselves to be as dirty and corrupt as PCRM, pushing voters to seek an alternative to
these established parties.
5 Eﬀects
Following the November 2014 parliamentary elections, Moldova experienced several struggles and
scandals: the diﬃculty of forming a government and choosing a prime minister, the loss of one
billion USD from Moldova’s GDP and growing antipathy towards pro-European parties.
A reduced mandate for the pro-European parties, the growth of rival PSRM, and on-going tensions
among the pro-European parties caused diﬃculties for the pro-European parties in forming a coali-
tion. Finally in February 2015, PLDM and PDM formed a minority coalition (Aliana Politic pentru
Moldova European, Political Alliance for a European Moldova). They proposed, and successfully
secured, the election of Chiril Gaburici to the post of prime minister by 60101 votes.
Gaburici, a 38-year-old businessman, had not held political oﬃce previously. Significantly, Voronin
(former PCRM prime minister) endorsed his appointment, suggesting that such an unconnected
figure was necessary. However, with no previous political experience, Gaburici was established as
a puppet to be manipulated rather than empowered. Gaburici’s weak position became evident in
dealing with the lost billion scandal, in which it emerged during 2014 that 15% of Moldova’s GDP
had disappeared from three of Moldova’s largest banks; these have since been placed under special
administration. Frustrated at the intractability of the relationship between Moldovan politics and
the banking crisis, Gaburici lasted just four months in oﬃce before resigning in June 2015 under
the auspices of his own scandal, concerning allegations of fake degrees.
At the time of writing (September 2015), a new government had been formed, the Alliance for
European Integration 3 led by PLDM candidate Valeriu Strele as prime minister. This follows the
rejection of PLDM’s previous candidate, Maia Sandu (Education Minister 20122015), by PL and
PDM, who objected to her overly tough stance in tackling the banking crisis (e.g. her desire to
remove the head of the National Bank of Moldova). Strele, as a wealthy career politician, is therefore
likely to be a weak prime minister, beholden to the strongmen of the pro-European coalition (Vlad
Filat and Vlad Plahotniuc) and their interests, and out of touch with public concern over rising
economic uncertainty, heightened by the hole in Moldova’s finances.
However, the continuous instability of the governmental coalitions, and the political and economic
scandals that have repeatedly led to their demise, means that support and trust for the pro-European
coalition is suﬀering, most notably the ascendancy of a new civic society movement (Platforma Civic
Demnitate i Adevr (DA), Civic Platform for Dignity and Truth) which since May 2015 had been
organising protests that culminated in the largest protest in Moldova’s history on 6 September 2015,
in a call for early elections, the resignation of Moldova’s President, Nicolae Timofti, and a fuller
investigation of the banking fraud. As such, the question remains how long the Alliance can hold oﬀ
early elections before 2018 and whether they will win enough seats to be able to form a coalition in
future elections, threatened both by the pro-Russian PSRM and the emergence of potentially new
political forces from within civil society, such as DA.
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